Objectivity and Values in the Islamic Social Sciences

Document Type : Original Article


Professor, The Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute Qom, Iran



The major motivation for the development of Islamic social sciences in the thought of ‘Allāmah Misbah is the observation that values play an essential role in the social sciences, and that in many works in these fields, the underlying values are inimical to religion, particularly to Islam. ‘Allāmah Misbah’s position on the Islamicization of the social sciences is best understood as a form of scientific pluralism. One of the major challenges to any form of scientific pluralism is how to maintain the objectivity of scientific research. Several approaches to objectivity are surveyed and it is suggested that a risk-account of scientific objectivity may be adopted to bolster claims for the objectivity of the islamicized social sciences.


Article Title [Persian]

عینیت و ارزش‌ها در علوم اجتماعی اسلامی

Author [Persian]

  • Hajj Muhammad Legenhausen
Professor, The Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute Qom, Iran
Abstract [Persian]

انگیزه اصلی توسعه علوم اجتماعی اسلامی در دیدگاه علامه مصباح، مشاهده این نکته است که ارزش‌ها، نقش اساسی در علوم اجتماعی دارند و در بسیاری از اثرات این زمینه، ارزش‌های پایه‌ای با دین، به ویژه اسلام، تعارض دارند. موضع علامه مصباح در خصوص اسلامی‌سازی علوم اجتماعی به بهترین وجه به عنوان شکلی از تکثرگرائی علمی درک می شود.  یکی از چالش‌های اصلی هر شکلی از تکثرگرائی علمی، چگونگی حفظ عینیت تحقیقات علمی است. تاکنون چندین رویکرد نسبت به صحت پژوهش علمی مورد بررسی قرار گرفته و پیشنهاد شده است که می‌توان از یک حسابرسی مخاطرات برای صحت علمی علوم اجتماعی اسلامی بهره‌برد تا ادعاهای صحت این علوم تقویت گردد.

Keywords [Persian]

  • عینیت
  • کثرت گرایی علمی
  • علوم اجتماعی اسلامی
  • اسلامی سازی
  • علم بدون ارزش
  • دوگانگی واقعیت- ارزش
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