



Evaluation of the Actions of Mu'awiyah and Imam Hasan (AS) in Achieving Two Contradictory Goals of Elimination and Preservation of the Shia Community after the Peace and Its Results¹

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Abstract

Accepting peace with Mu'awiyah ibn Abi Sufyan in 661 CE is one of the significant turning points in the history of Islam and Shiism. Despite Mu'awiyah's military dominance over the caliphate institution and Imam Hasan's (AS) stepping aside in his favor, the continuity of Shiism and the survival of the Shia population trapped in the vortex of anti-Shia policies of the newly empowered caliphate seemed unlikely under normal circumstances. Mu'awiyah's diverse package of challenges aimed at destroying the Shia identity encountered various responses from Imam Hasan (AS) and failed. The issue of this research is the examination of the most significant challenges posed by Muawiyah and the responses of Imam Hasan (AS) in achieving two contradictory goals of elimination or preservation of the Shia community. The results of this study indicate that with realism, rationality, and proportionate to the available resources of the Shia community, Imam Hasan's response package was able to turn the challenge posed by the Umayyad government into an opportunity for survival and the continuation of its historical existence.

Keywords: Imam Hasan (AS), Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan, Challenge Package, Response Package, Peace.

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1. Research Problem and the Necessity of Research on It

The examination of the process of the peace agreement between Muawiyah and Imam Hasan (AS) indicates two contradictory goals pursued by the signatories of the peace treaty. Muawiyah, due to his increasing power after the martyrdom of Imam Ali (AS) (the fourth Caliph), believed in the definite destruction of the Shia community by accepting the peace treaty and relinquishing the caliphate, alongside designing a special package of anti-Shia measures. On the other hand, Imam Hasan (AS), despite losing political power of the caliphate, swiftly confronted Muawiyah's package of actions against the Shia community by designing a protective package of measures. The hypothesis of this study asserts that the survival of the Shia community is the best evidence of the success of Imam Hasan's actions. The issue of this research is to examine and explain the packages of actions of each party involved in the story and the hypothesis of the success of Imam Hasan's actions and the failure of Muawiyah's actions in confirming the survival of the Shia community. The method of this research is descriptive-explanatory. The essential need for this research concerning the above-mentioned issue is the lack of a clear picture of the neglected actions of Imam Hasan as the responsible authority of Imamate following the conclusion of the peace treaty, which has depicted a passive and secluded image of him in public perception. There is less awareness of the conscious and purposeful engagement in soft and intelligent actions utilizing individual and social capacities to protect the minority and oppressed Shia community against the oppressive rule of the powerful and newly empowered Umayyads and their various actions aimed at the destruction of this severely weakened community.

2. Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework of this research is based on Arnold Toynbee's theory of challenge and response regarding the rise and fall of civilizations. According to his perspective, when the elite of a society can present an appropriate responsive (reactionary) power in facing its challenges through creative power, the survival and growth of a civilization (or society) are guaranteed, as failure to do so leads the civilization towards decay (Toynbee, 1964, p. 43). Based on this view, Imam Hasan's responses in the face of the significant challenge of eliminating the Shia community after signing the peace agreement, which manifested in a package of his own actions, demonstrated prescience and an appropriate response (based on the argument of the necessity of peace and protection thereof and abstention from any provocative actions by the enemy), ensuring the survival of the Shia community and providing an opportunity for constructive civilization to flourish.

3. Research Background

The causes and factors of Imam Hasan's (AS) peace treaty and its effects and consequences have been the subject of numerous studies. Some of these studies are mentioned below: For instance, in the article "A Comparative Study of the Reasons for Imam Hasan's (AS) Peace in Narratives and Historical Sources of the Two Factions Until the Seventh Century," after examining these reasons in Sunni and Shia sources, the authors considered the preservation of Muslims' interests as a common reason for both factions, albeit with different perspectives¹. Another example is the article "The Reasons for Imam Hasan's Peace from the Perspective of Historical Sociology," which lists future considerations in preserving Islamic civilization, safeguarding the lives of Shiites, and addressing economic crises as reasons for peace². Furthermore, in the article "Imam Hasan's Peace in the Context of Civilizational Thinking, Security, and Social Convergence," the two fundamental principles of civilization, security, and social convergence, have been identified as playing a fundamental role in achieving this peace³. While these and similar articles emphasize the causes and factors, and although they have addressed the outcomes and effects, none of them have examined the institutional confrontation between the Imamate and the Caliphate entities during the establishment of the Umayyad rule post-peace, irrespective of the reasons for its occurrence, based on the actions of both parties of the peace treaty (based on historical sources' reports) and the conflicting goals (protection of Shiite identity by Imam Hasan vs. its destruction by Muawiyah).

4. Introduction

Following the conclusion of the peace treaty between Imam Hasan (AS) and Muawiyah in the year 41 AH (661 CE) and the withdrawal of Imam Hasan (AS) from the caliphate, and Muawiyah's attainment of it, efforts by both parties to achieve two contradictory goals began. Imam Hasan (AS) sought to preserve the nascent Shiite community after the collapse of his rule in the post-peace era, while Muawiyah aimed to eliminate and completely destroy the Shiite population. These two personalities, under historically unequal conditions (one in a context of complete loss of political and military position, and the other in

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1. Rouhi Barandegi, Kavous, & Ahmadi, Ali. (1397 AH). "Spiritual Cave & Historical Sociology Perspectives on Imamate," *Imamate Quarterly Journal*, Vol.8, No.2 - Serial No.24, pp.77-103.
 2. Rajaei Litkuhi, Abdollah & Hosseini, Seyed Ali Akbar. (1400 AH). "The Reasons for Imam Hasan's (AS) Peace from the Perspective of Historical Sociology," Eighth International Conference on Humanities, Social Sciences, and Lifestyle, [Online]: <https://civilica.com/doc/1443939>.
 3. Vasei, Seyed Alireza. (1399 AH). "Studies in Islamic History", Spring 1399 AH, No. 44, pp. 166-182.

conditions of complete political and military power), designed a diverse set of actions proportionate to their resources and capabilities to achieve their contradictory goals. The examination of the detailed actions of each of them is the subject of this research. Describing the scope of actions is considered the only precise way of evaluation, given the aforementioned unequal conditions and Muawiyah's wider political power. Therefore, Muawiyah's actions in pursuing the elimination of the Shiite minority have been examined earlier due to his greater political power, followed by the elucidation of Imam Hasan's (AS) defensive actions.

5. Analysis of Muawiyah's Diverse Challenge-Inducing Actions towards the Survival of the Community

The newly empowered Umayyad caliphate, in pursuit of its goal, with extensive governmental resources at its disposal and the lack of these resources in the target population (the Shiite community), on one hand, and the necessity to adhere to certain parts of the peace treaty aimed at securing the Shiite community (which restrained his hand in physical violence against Shiites), made efforts towards their gradual elimination. The package of challenging actions, both general and specific, aimed at the survival of the Shiite community, includes:

5-1. Organized Propaganda Package to Create Challenges for the Survival of Shiites in the Public Sphere of the Islamic Community

This package pursued challenging actions in the public sphere with the aim of undermining the position of Shiites in the Muslim community, placing them in a high-pressure environment of intellectual and identity insecurity to create challenges to their survival. This approach, while demonstrating Muawiyah's superficial commitment to certain parts of the peace treaty, could be low-cost compared to the losses suffered by Shamis in battles like Siffin, and it aimed at gaining unprecedented influence throughout the Islamic world. Moreover, it targeted the Shiite community from within, aimed to undermine their vigor and vitality, and effectively contributed to the cultivation of a generation of skeptical Shiites. Furthermore, with increased challenges to survival, it aimed to eventually annihilate them. Considering these objectives, the most fundamental Shiite belief of that era (namely, the unparalleled position of Imam Ali in the hearts of Shiites) became the subject of this propagandistic assault, ranking at the forefront of the current and future actions of the nascent Umayyad rule, potentially leading to the degradation of the religious, ethical, and political stature of Imam Ali among future Shiite generations, thereby hastening the demise of Shiism. This operational decision became part of the long-term propaganda strategy of all Umayyad caliphs. (Baladhuri, n.d., Vol. 1, p. 184).

Only during the caliphate of Umar ibn Abdul Aziz was this practice briefly suspended (Ibn Athir, 1385 AH, Vol. 5, p. 117), introducing instability and disrespect towards the figure of Imam Ali in public religious ceremonies such as congregational prayers, Friday prayers, and Eid gatherings across most regions of the Islamic world, per the command of Muawiyah (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, 1967/1387 AH, Vol. 9, p. 57). This daily ritual posed a serious threat to the mental security of Shiites and could prove to be a significant challenge to the future survival of Shiism.

Administrative Action Package: The second part of Muawiyah's challenging action package aimed at the survival of Shiism in the public sphere was directed against the Shiite community. Muawiyah obstructed Shiite infiltration into his extensive governmental administrative structures by appointing opponents of Shiites to administrative positions. To ensure this, swearing and defamation of Imam Ali, seeking forgiveness for Uthman, neglecting Shiites, and focusing on Uthman's supporters were primary conditions for appointing individuals to administrative positions. For instance, during the appointment of Mughira bin Shu'bah as governor of Kufa, Muawiyah explicitly instructed him to enforce these directives (Tabari, 1980, Vol. 6, p. 141). It can be surmised that with such administrative commands, Shiites encountered extensive difficulties when interacting with government officials, especially in the most vital centers of Shiite life. Certainly, due to their minority status within the Islamic world at that time, such a decision could pose a significant challenge to the continued existence and survival of Shiism if injustices were inflicted upon them, as they had no legal recourse, and any complaints could result in severe punishments. Naturally, considering the small number of Shiites in the Islamic world at that time, this decision could potentially create a substantial challenge to the continuity and survival of Shiism.

Religious Action Package: The third segment of Muawiyah's challenging action package aimed at the survival of Shiism in the public sphere involved efforts to undermine the religious standing of Imam Ali. To achieve this goal, he issued commands such as the dissemination of fabricated traditions disparaging the Imam by well-known individuals like Abu Hurairah, Mughira bin Shu'bah, Amr ibn al-As, or companions' sons like Urwah bin Zubair (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, previous, Vol. 4, p. 63) and altering the circumstances of the revelation of certain Quranic verses (same source, Vol. 1, p. 361) to increase the number of traditions denigrating the Imam (same source, 1/64) and falsely attributing virtues of Imam Ali to others (Suyuti, n.d., p. 247, Jahiz, 1948 CE, Vol. 2, p. 61, Saqafi Kufi, 1355 SH, Vol. 1, p. 251). These efforts aimed to bring him closer to the primary objective. The continuation of these policies in that era included using the name of Imam Ali in naming children among families as an abandoned

practice and promoting the naming of opponents of Imam Ali (Ibn al-Imad Hanbali, 1404-1416 AH, Vol. 1, p. 148), significantly intensifying the challenge to the survival of Shiism.

Special Challenge Actions for Shiite Elites: The second group of Muawiyah's challenging action package for the survival of Shiism focused on provocative efforts among Shiite elites and leaders because he recognized them as the most influential figures among Shiites. He understood that any transformation in their mindset leading to different behavior towards his government could significantly impact the dissolution and rapid collapse of the Shiite community. These challenging actions included:

Creating Challenges to Eliminate and Prohibit Their Employment in Government Positions: Muawiyah's direction towards creating this challenge regarding the employment of Shiite elites and the removal of existing elites from the era of the Hasanid and Alawi governments (35-41 AH) relative to their officials, who held administrative positions except in Sham, in other Islamic states could uproot Shiite footholds in all Islamic regions faced with social, political, and economic challenges. This strategy aimed to isolate these figures, rendering them inactive and subsequently instilling doubt in their beliefs and convictions. If this phenomenon occurred, it could play a destructive role in the minority Shiite society, despite its tribal structure, especially in Kufa. Although there is no detailed report of these dismissals and appointments, given Muawiyah's political orientation, the occurrence of these events is highly probable, and the substantial removal of these officials was natural.

Creating a Challenge to Destroy the Psychological Spirit of Shiite Elites: Alongside his previous efforts, Muawiyah endeavored to criticize, undermine, and belittle these figures by organizing special gatherings, aiming to subject them to a challenge that would degrade them psychologically and spiritually. He tested their adherence to Shiite beliefs to influence even the slightest wavering in their thoughts and create internal challenges. In these sessions, he or his associates would sharply criticize Imam Ali (Ahmad Zaki Safwat, n.d., Vol. 2, pp. 101, 103, 105, 106-109, 94-99), Abdullah ibn Ja'far (same source, Vol. 2, pp. 127, 129), Al-Walid ibn Jabir Zalim Ta'i (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, previous, Vol. 16, p. 129, Zaki Safwat, previous, Vol. 2, p. 130), Ibn Qudamah Sadi (Suyuti, previous, p. 199-200), Abu al-Aswad al-Du'ali (Ibn Abd Rabbah, 1997 CE - 1417 AH, Vol. 5, p. 97, Isfahani, n.d. (a), Vol. 12, p. 309, Baladhuri, previous, Vol. 3, p. 221), Sa'id ibn Aridh (Isfahani, previous (b), Vol. 22, pp. 122-126; same source, Vol. 3, p. 131), Abu al-Tufail Amir ibn Waila (Isfahani, previous (b), Vol. 15, pp. 147-156), Saa'saa bin Sohan (Zaki Safwat, previous, Vol. 2, pp. 146, 148, 370), Haneef ibn Qais Tamimi (Tusi, 1381 AH - 1961 CE, p. 35, Al-Aghani, previous (b), Vol. 6, pp. 54-55, 142-143; Shareek

ibn Harith Salimi (Amin, 1881-1948 CE, Vol. 7, p. 344), Sadi ibn Ajlan known as Abu Imama Bahili (Ibn Abd al-Barr, 1380 AH, Vol. 3, p. 16; Dhahabi, 1413 CE, Vol. 4, p. 457; Majlisi, 1983 CE - 1403 AH, Vol. 42, p. 180), Adi ibn Hatim (Ibn Abd Rabbah, same source, Vol. 4, p. 113), Abdullah ibn Hashim Marqal (Mas'udi, 1358 AH, Vol. 2, p. 57), Aqeel ibn Abi Talib (Ibn Saad, 1405 CE, Vol. 4, pp. 31-33; Vol. 2, p. 124; Ibn Abd Rabbah, previous, Vol. 4, p. 91), Waqis ibn Sa'd ibn Abada (Ibn Tayfur, *Belaghat al-Nisa'*, n.d., p. 74; Zaki Safwat, Vol. 2, pp. 282-283), and distinguished women such as Arwa bint al-Harith ibn Abd al-Muttalib (Ibn Tayfur, same source, p. 71; Zaki Safwat, same source, Vol. 2, pp. 381-382-383), Amr al-Khayr bint al-Harish (Ibn Abd Rabbah, previous, Vol. 1, pp. 355-356), Bakarah al-Hilaliyah (Amin, previous, Vol. 3, p. 589), Zarka bint Adi al-Hamdaniyah (Ibn Abd Rabbah, Vol. 1, p. 348), Umm Sanaan bint Khuthaymah (Ibn Abd Rabbah, same source, Vol. 1, p. 349), Suda bint Amara bin al-Ashitar al-Hamdaniyah (Ibn Tayfur, previous, pp. 47-49; Ibn Abd Rabbah, same source, Vol. 1, p. 344), and Uqreshah bint al-Atarsh bin Rawaha (Ibn Tayfur, same source, pp. 103-104; Ibn Abd Rabbah, same source, Vol. 1, pp. 352-353). These individuals were among the most educated followers of Imam Ali who attended these critical sessions and were subjected to questioning, reproach, and humiliation by Muawiyah and his associates.

Special Challenge against the Shiite Imams: The second part of Muawiyah's package of actions to create specific challenges against Shiite elites involves examining his behavior towards Imam Hasan and Imam Husayn (peace be upon them), considering them collectively in line with his approach towards Shiite intellectuals. Although both Imams migrated to Medina, which was a desirable environment for them, Muawiyah's objectives were also aligned. Through this action, he aimed to keep them away from the political sphere of Iraq, separate both Imams from their Shia followers, the possibility of their disappearance among the companions and their offspring, and confine them within non-Shiite environments in the Hijaz region. However, Muawiyah, considering his high status and relationship with both Imams through the Prophet (PBUH), preserved their general respect by sending gifts (Isfahani, n.d. (b), Vol. 9, pp. 167-173; Baladhuri, previous, Vol. 3, pp. 41-42), thereby creating a positive image of his sincere relations with the two Imams in the public mind. His acknowledgment of the virtues of Imam Hasan (Ibn Athir, same source, Vol. 3, p. 175) was part of the same policy. Nevertheless, alongside his previous policies, Muawiyah employed public violence against them, creating an atmosphere filled with contempt and insults towards Imam Ali (AS) and his Shia followers. By exploiting Imam Hasan's commitment to the peace treaty (due to ethical reasons, not considering violation of commitment, lack of control over the operating

space, and not giving an excuse to the government) and forcing Imam Hasan to attend gatherings full of insults (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, same source, Vol. 4, p. 16), as well as showing non-commitment towards religious values in the Islamic government and specific acts of violence such as turning the Imam into an ordinary citizen after peace, organizing revenge sessions against Imam Ali (AS) publicly (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, same source, Vol. 2, p. 103; Isfahani, 1385 AH (a), p. 69; Baladhuri, same source, Vol. 5, pp. 26) and privately, and ultimately creating the conditions for the assassination of Imam Ali (AS), Muawiyah concluded his diverse package of challenging actions against the Shiite community, albeit failing to achieve the goal of eliminating this community.

Analysis of Imam Hasan's Varied Responses in Preserving the Shiite Community: The counterpart to Muawiyah's actions was the response of Imam Hasan (AS) as the leader of the Shiites, which aimed to protect them from the continuous harms and damages inflicted by Muawiyah's package of actions through a well-designed package of diverse and comprehensive responses against Muawiyah's challenges. It is clear that elimination-oriented challenging packages versus preservation-oriented response packages (under unequal situational, resource, and population conditions favoring preservationists) make it easier to eliminate the eliminationists. Based on this, it must be acknowledged that Imam Hasan (AS) faced even greater difficulties in designing these proportionate response packages and required more precise evaluations. In a broad classification, Imam's design of these response packages can be categorized into two groups:

Package of Idealistic Reactions Aimed at Preserving Shiite Life: This package of reactions could have been designed based on Shiite societal ideals and, relying on influential Shiite figures such as Hijr ibn Adi (Dinvari, 2011 AD, p. 202), Sulayman Sard Khuzai, and Sufyan ibn al-Layl al-Hamdani, who were both willing and capable of mobilizing forces, all three of whom were counted among the opponents of peace (Dinvari, previous, pp. 202, 136; Hakim Nishapuri, 1335 AH, Vol. 3, p. 170). However, this group was in the minority, and the majority of Shiites favored peace. Aside from any designs aimed at entering this package of idealistic reactions serving as sufficient pretext for Muawiyah to destroy the scattered community, weaken the Shiite population severely, and drive them towards his ultimate goal, such a reactive package was incompatible with the ultimate goal of Imam Hasan (AS), which was the protection of the Shiite community.

Package of Pragmatic Reactive Measures Aimed at Preserving Shiite Life: In these difficult circumstances where Muawiyah's arrival in Kufa and the announcement of disregarding the terms of the peace treaty made it even more challenging (Baladhuri, previous, Vol. 3, pp. 44-46; Ibn Abi al-Hadid, previous,

Vol. 16, p. 46), Imam Hasan (AS) chose the difficult and winding path of pragmatism to protect the community from complete destruction. His initial reactive step, based on public demand, was accepting peace firmly but to achieve the goal and engage, he had to design a diverse set of reactions compatible with the challenges to ensure the continuity of Shiite social life in the short term. The first part of this package was an immediate mental management response among Shiites to live in post-peace conditions to prevent one of Muawiyah's hopes of creating internal challenges within the minority Shiite community. This significantly depended on the position of Shiite intellectuals in accepting or rejecting the peace treaty terms. Therefore, the Imam's first action was:

Persuasion of the First Elite: Imam's First Reaction to Muawiyah's Challenges: While the majority of Kufa and Iraq had no objections to accepting peace, the influential minority of Shiites felt uncomfortable with this and could undermine Imam's leadership for the future by labeling him as "O Humiliator of the Believers," "The Darkened Faces of the Believers," or "The Disgrace of the Believers" (Ibn Abd al-Barr, 1380 AD, Vol. 1, p. 386). They could also spread further despair among the Shiite community and open the door to their spiritual destruction and internal discord within the Shiite community. Therefore, the Imam began his actions with a diverse package of arguments such as disapproval of the majority's desire to continue the war (Ibn Asakir, 1400 AH, pp. 178-179; Ibn Athir, previous, Vol. 3, p. 406; Dinvari, Akhbar al-Tawal, pp. 217-220), preserving the lives of loyal Shiites for a specific period (Dinvari, previous, p. 221), safeguarding himself and his family (Ibn A'sam, 1372 AD, Vol. 4, pp. 158-160; Harani, 1376 AD, p. 227), confronting the complete annihilation of the religiously observant (Ibn Asakir, previous, p. 203), dignifying the believers (Ibn Qutaybah, 1413 AH, p. 136), relying on the Prophet's tradition in conducting an unpleasant peace that later became pleasant (Majlisi, same source, Vol. 10, p. 101; Waqidi, n.d., Vol. 2, pp. 606-607; Ibn Sa'd, previous, Vol. 2, p. 101), testing the Shiites in following the Imam in war and peace (Tabari, 1980 AD, Vol. 6, p. 93; Arbali, 1379 AD, Vol. 2, p. 159), and accepting divine fate and decree based on prophetic traditions (Bukhari, 1212 AD, Vol. 2, p. 118; Ibn Kathir, 1351 AH, Vol. 8, p. 9; Bayhaqi, Al-Mahasin, 55), which was started with his actions. These explanations were evidently useful for both specific and general Shiite communities and prevented further dispersion among them, maintaining Imam's leadership over them. The successful execution of this persuasive reaction quickly achieved goals such as registering Shiites as a religious group (mentioned by the same name in the treaty) (Ibn A'sam, previous, Vol. 4, p. 158), saving the Shiite community from immediate destruction in the short term, extending the time for peace, transforming the goal

of destroying Shiism from a simple target to a complex one for the Umayyads (as mentioned in Muawiyah's will) (Tabari, same source, Vol. 6, p. 179), and keeping the door closed for further division within the minority Shiite community, accompanied by the evaluation of available resources for proportional reactions in ensuring the continuity of Shiite life for Imam Hasan (AS).

Package for Evaluating Existing Facilities in the Shiite Community: Unlike Muawiyah, who held a position among the supporters of the majority, Imam Hasan (AS) was the leader of the minority Shiite community and, in the immediate aftermath of the peace, had limited resources. After ensuring that the rapid destruction of the Shiite community by Muawiyah was not possible, with a dual pragmatic approach of accepting peace and persuading the elite, now all existing facilities needed to be evaluated realistically in the form of a package of capabilities and assets to avoid any inappropriate actions with the available resources in both thought and action, and to further stabilize the newly recognized Shiite society. The result of this evaluation of capabilities included: relative security for Shiites based on the terms of the peace treaty and the possibility of their normal religious activities in society (Tabari, previous, Vol. 6, p. 69). These two possibilities gradually provided the groundwork for preserving the religious identity of Shiites in those challenging historical circumstances.

Package of Operational Reactions to Utilize Existing Capabilities in the Shiite Community: The above two possibilities showed that Shiites could remain hopeful about continuing their social life. However, the official order of Muawiyah to all governors of cities regarding cursing Imam Ali (AS) was a severe threat, especially harshly executed in Iraq. This order could incite recognized Shiites to react favorably and, of course, inappropriately to Muawiyah's intentions, thereby identifying both the unknown Shiites and the familiar ones, benefiting the Umayyads in both cases. During that difficult and enduring historical period in the life of Shiites, the Shiite Imam had to have a special design of protective tools against reactionary Shiite responses and compel Shiites to use them. These tools included:

Use of Taqiyya Reaction in Protecting the Physical Community of Shiites: The only method and mechanism that could exist against this great threat (rapid reactions resulting from the sensitivity of the Shiite community to provocative Umayyad propaganda) was the tradition of taqiyya. This tradition had both Quranic principles (Suyuti, 2003 AD (b), Vol. 4, p. 131) and was accepted in the tradition of the Prophet (PBUH) (Ibn Majah, 1379 AH, Vol. 1, p. 659; Suyuti, 1424 AD (c), Vol. 8, p. 281) and held an important position in the life of Imam Ali (AS) (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, same source, Vol. 17, p. 62) and was part of Imam Ali's instructions for the future of Shiites after him (Imam Ali,

1415 AD, Sermon 31). However, it should be noted that the implementation of this tradition and important reaction required internal social coordination among the Shiites, which included:

Imam's Commitment and the Compliance of His Close Circle with Taqiyya Reaction: It was natural to expect the leader of any community to adhere to what he preaches so that his influence and command over his followers deepen. Imam Hasan (AS), besides being bound as a Muslim by verses of the Quran that admonish against inconsistency between words and deeds, was aware of and followed the tradition of the Prophet (PBUH) and Imam Ali (AS) regarding commitment to taqiyya in difficult circumstances. Therefore, he participated in mosques and congregations of Muslims, adhered to the appointed Imam by the government, and remained silent when hearing curses towards Imam Ali (AS) from the mosque preacher, leaving the response to God (Suyuti, same source (a), p. 73). He even treated sympathetically and kindly those affected by negative propaganda from Muawiyah, who had traveled to Medina expressing their hatred and curses towards Imam Hasan (AS) and Imam Ali (AS), transforming them spiritually and intellectually (Al-Mabardi, 1427 AH, Vol. 1, p. 235). Although Imam's behavior was essential for executing taqiyya, it was not sufficient for its penetration among Shiites.

Commitment of Shiite Elite Groups to Taqiyya Reaction: Alongside Imam Hasan (AS), the companionship of the Imam's close circle with him was deemed essential. They held significant positions among the Shiite masses, and any deviation or lack of adherence to this tradition and appropriate reaction in those specific historical circumstances undermined its effectiveness. Their commitment and synchronization, particularly by Imam Husayn (AS) with Imam Hasan (AS), led to the tranquility of the Shiite community (Ibn Abd Rabbah, same source, Vol. 1, p. 131; Ibn Tayfur, same source, p. 67), rendering Muawiyah unsuccessful in achieving his goal. Reported confrontations between Shiite elites and Muawiyah occurred in private sessions, which were convened under Muawiyah's coercion but ensured the safety of the elites. The incident involving the protest of Hujr ibn Adi, a prominent Shiite figure, against the offensive remarks of a preacher that led to his martyrdom, occurred after the martyrdom of Imam Hasan (AS), and although it was an act of breaking allegiance, it did not signify allegiance to Muawiyah (Tabari, same source, Vol. 4, p. 189). Implementing taqiyya by all influential elements of the Shiite community restored relative peace to the Shiite society. They also gained the opportunity to participate in public Muslim gatherings without attracting harsher actions from the Umayyads by remaining silent towards Umayyad preachers. Even when forced to participate in cursing Imam Ali (AS), they subtly undermined the Umayyad's sharp enmity and instilled false confidence in the

minds of Umayyad government agents about their allegiance.

Package of Possible Propaganda Reactions in Special and Public Spaces:

With the assurance of Shiite leadership regarding the possibility of sustaining Shiite social life using the aforementioned package of actions, conditions were provided for designing a package of possible actions in stable social settings. Although these opportunities were never comparable to the extensive advertising capabilities of the Umayyad caliphate, they could, in their own measure, have an impact on the polluted and anti-Shiite public sphere. Utilizing short-term advertising opportunities provided a special chance in public spaces for the Imam and Shiite elites to respond to some of Muawiyah's accusations. Fatedly, Muawiyah organized special gatherings to provide the opportunity to discuss Muawiyah's package of actions. This package of propaganda reactions allowed for the clarification of the Alawi lineage by the Imam in public gatherings or private sessions (Tabari, same source, Vol. 2, p. 6; Ibn Abi al-Hadid, previous, Vol. 4, p. 16). This scenario also unfolded in private sessions with Shiite elites and Muawiyah, facilitating an exceptional advertising space for the Shiites and paving the way for their historical registration as the identity of Shiism. Some of the most important critiques and criticisms by Shiite elites in these sessions included reproaching Muawiyah for ridicule (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, same source, p. 49), highlighting Muawiyah's background in disbelief (Amin, same source, Vol. 6, p. 286), demonstrating the superiority of Imam Ali over rivals (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, same source, Vol. 11, p. 19), seeking exemption from the compulsory allegiance to cursing Imam Ali (Ibn Abd Rabbah, previous, Vol. 4, p. 28), Muawiyah's indifference to gifts (Shushtari, 1374-1375, Vol. 2, p. 521), reminding Muawiyah of his commitments towards Shiites based on the peace treaty (Suyuti, same source (a), p. 176), forcing Muawiyah to listen to three qualities of Imam Ali (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, same source, Vol. 8, p. 11), doubting the legitimacy of Muawiyah's caliphate (Amin, same source, Vol. 7, p. 344), discouraging Muawiyah from comparing himself to Imam Ali (Majlisi, same source, Vol. 42, p. 180), making Muawiyah cry while narrating the virtues of Imam Ali (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, same source, Vol. 8, p. 225), informing Muawiyah about Shiite's deep love for Imam Ali (Bihaqi, 1423 AH, p. 26), recalling Muawiyah's brief support for Uthman followed by his unjust bloodshed (Mas'udi, same source, Vol. 2, p. 26), compelling Muawiyah to apologize (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, same source, Vol. 6, p. 297), describing the history of Shiism in the presence of Muawiyah with his advisers (same source), depicting the fear and efforts of Muawiyah's closest advisers and the superior logic of the Alawites (Nasr ibn Muzahim, 1282 AH, p. 328; Ibn Abi al-Hadid, same source, Vol. 8, p. 30), describing Imam Ali's soldiers in the presence of Muawiyah (Ibn Abi al-Hadid, same source, Vol. 2, p. 124), poems recited about Imam Ali's

martyrdom in Muawiyah's assembly (Amin, same source, Vol. 2, p. 475), recalling the analogy of Shamite soldiers to a fallen donkey in Siffin (Ibn Abd Rabbah, Vol. 2, pp. 116-119), compelling Muawiyah to admit the truth (same source, Vol. 2, p. 108), expressing Shiite's hatred towards the Umayyads in Muawiyah's presence (same source, Vol. 2, p. 104), analyzing Imam Ali's domestic policies and comparing them to Muawiyah's policies (same source, Vol. 2, pp. 113-115), obtaining benefits from Muawiyah for Shiite's long-term interests while maintaining principles (same source), demonstrating the legitimacy of Imam Ali in the Battle of Siffin (same source, Vol. 2, p. 106), compelling Muawiyah to adhere to Alawite justice (same source, Vol. 2, p. 102). A glance at the list of these topics and discussions elucidated in the assemblies of the Imam and Shiites with Muawiyah narrates the value of this opportunity, which, with the package of intelligent actions by the Imam, made short-term advertising opportunities accessible to the Shiites and contributed to the continuity of Shiite intellectual, cultural, and social life.

Package of Economic Responses to Umayyad Economic Challenges: Another important reaction that Imam Hasan al-Mujtaba benefited from in preserving Shiism was the legacy left by Imam Ali. The legacy of Imam Ali encompassed various dimensions that were greatly utilized during the economic hardships of the Shiites and the risky efforts of Muawiyah. Imam Ali, foreseeing the future constraints of Shiite thought, provided financial independence opportunities for the Shiite community through endowments. In this endowment, Imam Ali managed numerous endowments with abundant incomes (Ashkouri, Endowments of Amir al-Mu'minin Ali, p. 86 onwards), which significantly helped in preserving Shiism during challenging economic conditions. Imam Hasan inherited this financial abundance in new challenging circumstances and was able to utilize these funds, which were beyond the reach of Muawiyah, to support Shiite currents, leadership, and the Shiites themselves. These reactions included: extensive spending opportunities by the Imam, reported three times (Kulayni, 1388, Vol. 7, p. 54); enjoying a continuous financial income beyond Muawiyah's reach (Ibn Shubah, 1410, p. 225); supporting groups from society such as slaves and laborers who worked on lands and could form unidentified Shiite populations, as explicitly mentioned in the endowment document (same source, p. 87); presenting superior ethical qualities of Banu Hashim against Banu Umayyah and financially supporting poets (Bihqi, p. 56).

Package of Scientific Responses: Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) also inherited the scientific legacy left by Imam Ali, which was preserved in the form of traditions, sermons, and letters. There is no credible information available in sources about how Imam Hasan utilized Imam Ali's scientific legacy, except that Imam Hasan, considering the existing circumstances, managed to convey

some of Imam Ali's traditions (Ibn Abd Rabbah, same source, Vol. 4, p. 28), which, of course, helped in the preservation of this part of Imam Ali's scientific legacy and served as a reaction against the trend of erasing Imam Ali's name from the memory of the Islamic community. However, the appropriate response of Imam Hasan was to base the dissemination of knowledge (the tradition of transmitting hadith) on this established scientific tradition, thus laying the groundwork for more cognitive areas for the small Shiite community and, as much as possible, preventing the influx of fabricated traditions or reducing their impact, which was achieved by transmitting traditions from the Imam encompassing various doctrinal, ethical, and jurisprudential aspects, thereby aiding in the expansion of the Shiite school (Baghstani, *The Scientific Legacy of Imam Hasan and Imam Husayn*, pp. 311-325).

Reasons for the Success of Imam Hasan's Reaction Package Against Umayyad Challenges: Perhaps fewer statesmen, whether supportive or opposed to Umayyad caliphate (which managed to lead the Alawite and Hassanid governments to defeat and downfall), expected anything other than the victory of that government and the complete destruction of the Shiite minority community, especially considering the vastly unequal circumstances between the two rivals, viewing this as the inevitable fate of the Shiite community. However, based on the strategies outlined in the article, the specific design by Imam Hasan (peace be upon him) to protect the Shiite minority community after the peace agreement, which was a combination of realism against blind idealism; high power of persuasion over the necessity of accepting peace and adhering to it in new circumstances with Quranic, Hadith, rational, and realistic arguments; coherence within the Shiite community around the vital axis of life after peace; thwarting the provocative policies of Muawiyah relying on the policy of taqiyya for Shiite indifference (which contributed to Shiite societal calmness and distancing from revolts and armed conflicts); financial, economic, intellectual, and scientific support for the Shiite minority community against the vehement Umayyad propaganda, economic, and intellectual policies, enabled the Shiite community to be self-confident and pave the way out of those difficult historical circumstances, rendering the challenging Umayyad government actions futile in ensuring Shiite survival, creating an opportunity for the survival of the Shiite community, and facilitating its potential for greater civilizational roles in the future.

Conclusion

Conducting this research within the conceptual framework of Arnold Toynbee's challenge and response theory about the rise and fall of civilizations, which allows for a new reading of the two action packages of Muawiyah and Imam

Hasan (peace be upon him) in achieving two opposing goals of elimination and preservation of the Shiite community, where the first package was of a challenging nature and the second package was responsive, based on Imam Ali's precise evaluations of the real possibilities of the Shiite community (identifying threats and opportunities, internal Shiite and external Shiite assessments), continued with the support of Shiite elites, these responses upheld the Shiite Imamate institution for self-management over the Shiite minority community (against the significant challenges it faced), making the Shiite community a leader in supporting itself and providing measured responses to major challenges posed by Muawiyah, thwarting the primary Umayyad challenges to eliminate Shiism and ensuring the continuity of Shiite life in important social spheres such as science, while creating opportunities for even greater civilizational roles in its future.

Recommendation

This kind of confrontational examination of the Imamate institution versus the caliphate institution can extract numerous overlooked benefits from historical and Hadith texts for the history of Imamate and Shiism, and even reconstruct a new historical-cultural-political-social-economic history based on the responsive actions of each Imam against the institution of caliphate in Islamic history and Shiism, as well as the history of Islamic civilization. Therefore, it is suggested to define a comprehensive project outline for the eras of Imamate of each of the Imams (peace be upon them) and assign it to researchers to illuminate a clearer picture of their actions and responses in various historical periods and rewrite the history of Imamate, Shiism, Islamic history, and Islamic civilization anew.

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